contracting authorities a right to reject tenders verified to be abnormally low.
Hereby, the provision on abnormally low tenders indirectly regulates the tenderers' price setting.
The provision seemingly implies that there is no obligation to reject abnormally low tenders. This is the point of departure taken in the book. When contracting authorities are given the possibility of rejecting tenders that are verified to be abnormally low, thoughts are directed towards the difficult task of distinguishing between genuine price competition and abnormally low tenders.
In other words, by making it possible to reject abnormally low tenders, it is implicitly acknowledged that not all forms of (price) competition are desirable.
The book is a slightly amended version of the author's ph.d. thesis at Copenhagen School of Business.

Indholdsoversigt:

Preface
List of abbreviations
Chapter 1. Introduction and methodology

PART I. FOUNDATIONS
Chapter 2. Competition as legal context and as an objective of the public procurement Directives
Chapter 3. Public tenderers
Chapter 4. Practical relevance of the provision on abnormally low tenders

PART II. ABNORMALLY LOW TENDERS DE LEGE LATA
Chapter 5. Development of the contents of the central provision on abnormally low tenders in the various public procurement Directives
Chapter 6. Case law concerning the provision on abnormally low tenders
Chapter 7. Literature review and a case for critique

PART III. PROPOSALS
Chapter 8. The coverage of cost approach: how low is 'abnormally low'?
Chapter 9. Comparative analysis: coverage of cost versus risk of non-performance
Chapter 10. Public tenderers as Market Economy Tenderers

PART IV. CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 11. Conclusions
Postscript - List of documents - Regulations - Directives - COM finals - Additional Commission documents -
List of Judgments and Decisions - Judgments of the European Court of Justice - Judgments of the Court in First Instance -
Commission Decisions - National judgments and decisions - List of literature - Abstract - Index